Verify. Include. Deliver. Prove.

Nigeria's social register was built over years by many hands, and it carries duplicates, transcription errors and records that resolve to nobody at all. Before a single naira moves, every inherited record is put through a digital hygiene scrub.

• NIN and BVN validation. Each record is checked against the national identity and bank verification registers — not against a spreadsheet of names.
• A traffic light, not a delete key. Green records are promoted to the live register, amber records are held for a field officer to re-verify in person, and red records are quarantined and never paid. Nothing is silently deleted; a quarantined record keeps its history.
• Biometric liveness. Where a field officer enrols or re-verifies someone, a live biometric capture is required — a photograph of a photograph does not pass.
• One identity, one record. Identifiers are stored as one-way hashes, which makes a duplicate impossible to create even by accident, and makes the register itself useless to anyone who steals it.

Verification that excludes the poorest defeats the purpose. The hardest households to pay are the ones with no account, no smartphone and no branch within a day's travel, so inclusion is engineered rather than hoped for.

• Tier-1 accounts, opened for you. A beneficiary with no bank account gets a Tier-1 account opened on their behalf through the consortium bank, using the identity already verified — no branch visit, no minimum balance, no paperwork.
• Enrolment where people live. Field officers enrol inside their assigned local government areas, and the platform will not accept an enrolment from outside the officer's geo-fenced area.
• Selection from the register, not by request. Households are drawn and ranked from the National Social Register. Nobody can add themselves, and no officer can add a name that has not been verified.
• A way to complain without an account. Anyone can report a problem, anonymously, and receives a tracking code with a published response time.

Cash in envelopes is where transfers leak. Every naira on this platform travels bank-to-account, and the card that reaches the beneficiary is tracked from the printer to their hand.

• Two approvals, never the same person. Whoever prepares a payment batch cannot approve it, and the first approver cannot be the second. The platform blocks it at the database, not by policy.
• Conditionality checked before release. On conditional programmes, the cycle's conditions — school attendance, a health visit — are evaluated first. A household that misses one has its payment held and can be reinstated, never quietly dropped.
• Settlement through the consortium bank. Payments settle directly into the beneficiary's account through Fidelity Bank, and each one is reconciled against the bank's own statement. What the bank says happened and what the platform says happened must agree.
• Chain of custody with GPS. Every card is scanned at each handover point, with location, from the personalisation bureau to the field officer.
• Biometric-for-PIN. A beneficiary's PIN is released only after their live fingerprint matches the identity the card was issued to. An officer holding a stack of cards cannot activate one of them.
• Geo-economic locking. Cards are locked to spending inside the beneficiary's own local government area, so the transfer circulates in the local economy instead of draining to a distant city. Travel exceptions are granted for a fixed window and are audited.

An audit trail that the operator can edit is not evidence. Every material action here is chained cryptographically, and the chain's fingerprint is published so anyone outside the platform can hold it to account.

• A hash-chained ledger. Each entry carries the fingerprint of the entry before it. Altering an old entry changes every fingerprint after it, so tampering cannot be quiet.
• Financial actions cannot happen unaudited. A disbursement and its audit entry are written in the same transaction — if the record cannot be written, the money does not move.
• The head is published. The chain's current fingerprint is anchored on a schedule, published on this site and appended to a file kept outside the database. Anyone can check a fingerprint they hold against it.
• The figures publish themselves. This site is generated from the same aggregates the Ministry reads internally. There is no reporting department in between, and no manual step where a number can be improved.
• Aggregates only, always. Public pages read pre-computed totals and nothing else. Areas covering fewer than ten beneficiaries have their breakdown withheld so a household cannot be identified.